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ABSTRACT
The insecurity of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) paradigm continues
to wreak havoc in consumer and critical infrastructure realms. Sev-
eral challenges impede addressing IoT security at large, including,
the lack of IoT-centric data that can be collected, analyzed and
correlated, due to the highly heterogeneous nature of such devices
and their widespread deployments in Internet-wide environments.
To this end, this paper explores macroscopic, passive empirical
data to shed light on this evolving threat phenomena. This not
only aims at classifying and inferring Internet-scale compromised
IoT devices by solely observing such one-way network traffic, but
also endeavors to uncover, track and report on orchestrated “in the
wild” IoT botnets. Initially, to prepare the effective utilization of
such data, a novel probabilistic model is designed and developed
to cleanse such traffic from noise samples (i.e., misconfiguration
traffic). Subsequently, several shallow and deep learning models are
evaluated to ultimately design and develop a multi-window convo-
lution neural network trained on active and passive measurements
to accurately identify compromised IoT devices. Consequently, to
infer orchestrated and unsolicited activities that have been gener-
ated by well-coordinated IoT botnets, hierarchical agglomerative
clustering is deployed by scrutinizing a set of innovative and effi-
cient network feature sets. By analyzing 3.6 TB of recent darknet
traffic, the proposed approach uncovers a momentous 440,000 com-
promised IoT devices and generates evidence-based artifacts related
to 350 IoT botnets. While some of these detected botnets refer to
previously documented campaigns such as the Hide and Seek,
Hajime and Fbot, other events illustrate evolving threats such as
those with cryptojacking capabilities and those that are targeting
industrial control system communication and control services.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Embedded systems security; Net-
work security; •Computingmethodologies→Classification
and regression trees; Neural networks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
With the escalating adoption of the Internet-of-Things (IoT) par-
adigm in numerous realms such as critical infrastructure, home
networks [2], transportation [11], and various others [8], an in-
creasing number of devices are becoming directly Internet-facing.
Although IoT devices can be deployed behind NAT gateways, a
plethora of such devices are indeed directly connected to the In-
ternet and/or employ port-forwarding for proper and simplified
provisioning and management [16]. Such devices, unfortunately,
continue to lack basic security protocols and measures, rendering
them easy targets for exploitations and hence recruitment within
coordinated IoT botnets [7]. Furthermore, there exists several IoT
inherent factors such as their heterogeneous nature and limited
processing resources, which further complicate addressing their
security requirements. Additionally, despite much attention to IoT
in the security community [25, 36, 41], subpar attention is being
paid to IoT security aspects by their manufacturers and users, on
top of an overwhelming lack of maturity of IoT-specific update
procedures for patch management.
In this context, the broad topic of IoT security has been a partic-
ular area of focus in the security community after it was revealed
that Mirai [5], via infecting more than 200,000 devices, was behind
the debilitating Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks of
late 2016 - a direct result of such deficiencies. Indeed, this event
demonstrated the sheer capabilities for maliciousness by way of
instrumenting exploitable IoT devices. Moreover, the IoT botnet
environment has been evolving and expanding to include several
more players who ultimately compete for control of IoT devices by
means of newly-disclosed vulnerabilities. In order to supersede the
opposition, the removal of any existent malware on the given device
is now amongst the attackers’ objectives. Additionally, such IoT-
centric malware will additionally kill running services [5, 29] and
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can perform checks to evade honeypots [35, 54]. Further exacerbat-
ing the situation, an unfortunate by-product of this competition is
the promotion of even more sophisticated methods of exploitation–
versus that of the first generation of Mirai. These novel adversarial
approaches frequently result in the exposure of ports and services
other than that of Telnet [32], the most common attack vector
associated within IoT. All-in-all, this race between adversaries ulti-
mately leads to an extremely dynamic behavior which makes the
tasks of inferring and attributing compromised IoT devices and
their coordinated illicit activities incredibly daunting.
Moreover, acquiring IoT-centric empirical data to be curated and
analyzed for maliciousness is problematic, given the large-scale de-
ployments of such devices in Internet-wide realms. Broadly, a major
challenge related to the inference of IoT botnets through the analy-
sis of network traffic is the lack of sound data-driven artifacts to
assert that the perceived activities are actually originating from IoT
devices and not typical machines. One solution would be to corre-
late such inferred probing IP addresses with databases gathered by
services such as Shodan [48] and/or Censys [49], which collect and
index information pertaining to IoT devices via IP crawlers, active
scanning based on open ports and available services, and banner
grabbing. At the same time, while doing so provides large-scale and
valuable information regarding Internet-facing IoT devices, the set
of those identified is indeed incomplete. This issue is in large part
due to the scope of said services being limited to only the devices
that are reachable by their scanners; a vast number of the targeted
services and ports end up filtered out by firewalls. Moreover, upon
infection, IoT malware typically blocks ports and disables common
outward facing services (i.e., Telnet, CWMP, ADB, etc.) [5, 29] or
modify the banners, which further impedes the indexing of all the
inferred IoT devices. To this end, it becomes highly desirable to
employ learning techniques for predicting (i.e., fingerprinting) the
device types of previously unknown IoT sources.
In light of the aforementioned information, in this work, we
explore passive measurements rendered by analyzing darknet data
(i.e., Internet-scale traffic targeting routable yet unused IP address)
to shed light on the insecurity of the IoT paradigm at large. Addi-
tionally, to motivate empirical (and operational) IoT cyber security
initiatives as well as aid in reproducibility of the obtained results, we
make the source codes of all the developed methods available to the
research community at https://github.com/COYD-IoT/COYD-IoT.
Specifically, we frame the contributions of this work as follows:
• Designing and implementing a darknet-specific, formal sani-
tization model that is capable of identifying and filtering out
darknet misconfiguration traffic to permit the effective stor-
age and processing of network telescope data. The model is
advantageous as it does not rely on arbitrary cut-off thresh-
olds, provides different likelihood models to distinguish be-
tween misconfiguration and other form of darknet traffic,
and is independent from the nature of the source of the traffic.
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed model presents
a first attempt ever to systematically fingerprint and thus
filter-out darknet misconfiguration traffic.
• Devising and developing an IoT-centric fingerprinting ap-
proach rooted in machine/deep learning and active mea-
surements that is capable of inferring Internet-scale com-
promised IoT devices by exclusively operating on network
telescope data. Using more than 3 TB of recent darknet data,
the results expose more than 400,000 compromised IoT de-
vices from very well-known vendors.
• Designing and implementing an IoT-specific botnet infer-
ence methodology based upon effective and lightweight data-
driven features, and hierarchical agglomerative clustering.
The outcome uncovers more than 300 IoT botnets in the wild,
where more than 25 of them contain upwards of 1,000 ex-
ploited bots. Additionally, the results shed light on evolving
IoT botnets such as those possessing cryptojacking capa-
bilities (which were shown to be coordinated by the same
“player” due to the usage of the same key) and those that
were inferred to be targeting industrial control systems.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, we review the literature to demonstrate the state-of-the-art
contributions of this work. In Section 3, we detail the darknet pre-
processing model, the studied machine/deep learning models for
fingerprinting compromised IoT devices, in addition to elaborating
on the the IoT-centric botnet inference methodology. Further, in
Section 4, we execute and evaluate the proposed approach to report
on its results and discuss the obtained findings. Finally, Section 5
summarizes the contributions of this paper, discusses a few limita-
tions and pinpoints several topics which pave the way for future
work.
2 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we elaborate on three topics central to the contempo-
rary IoT security landscape. The first point of emphasis focuses on
network telescopes as powerful mechanisms to capture IoT-specific,
illicit network traffic. The second of which encompasses efforts
pertaining to IoT device fingerprinting and the detection of com-
promised IoT devices. Finally, we enumerate the literature related
to IoT-specific botnet analysis.
Network telescopes. A network telescope, or a darknet, is a set of
deployed, routable, allocated, yet unused IP addresses to passively
observe incoming Internet-scale traffic [23]. Given that these IP
addresses are not associatedwith any services, traffic targeting them
is thereby deemed as unsolicited [10]; originating from infected
devices, victims of denial of service attacks, or misconfiguration.
Network telescopes have been recurrently proven to be credible
sources for the investigation of large-scale, Internet-wide activities
such as that of probing [9, 17] and DDoS attacks [22, 34].
In a recent study [40], the authors revealed more than 120,000
Internet-scale exploited IoT devices, by correlating darknet traffic
and Shodan databases to investigate IoT probing campaigns. Fur-
ther, Torabi et al. [53] conducted large-scale correlations between
passive measurements and IoT-relevant information to investigate
and disclose malicious activities associated with more than 26,000
IoT devices. Moreover, by means of applying filters to network tele-
scope data in order to discern Mirai-relevant traffic, Antonakakis
et al. [5] were able to gather IoT-related information pertaining to
roughly 1.2 million Mirai-infected IP addresses during 7 months, in
addition to examining their associated detection-avoidance tech-
niques. Cetin et al. [12] conducted empirical studies on IoT malware
cleanup efforts and remediation rates in a medium-sized Internet
Service Provider (ISP) leveraging darknet and honeypot sources.
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While such contributions are noteworthy, several shortcomings
can be noted. First, such works rely on a specific IoT malware
signature (i.e., tcpSeq == dstIP) which indeed can not provide a
comprehensive identification of all IoT bots since many do not
follow this signature; our measurements have revealed that less
than 25% of all the inferred IoT bots match this specific signature.
Second, the majority of these and related works solely depend on
databases gathered by Internet scanning services, whichmiss a large
portion of the actual IoT bot population. In contrast, we propose
herein an approach consisting of active and passive measurements,
coupled with machine/deep learning techniques, which leads to a
more comprehensive view of the IoT botnets’ populations.
IoT device fingerprinting. The vast majority of IoT inference
methods utilized in previous works rely on text information in
gathered banners and leverage regular expressions to find specific
patterns, or using text summarization methods [47] as input to
classifiers [2]. In turn, several research efforts have alternatively
elected to attempt IoT device fingerprinting by observing network
traffic. For instance, Meidan et al. [31] manually labeled network
traffic generated by IoT devices and employed a supervised learning
algorithm to classify IoT devices for a given organization’s network.
Moreover, Miettinen et al. [33] leveraged network traffic generated
by IoT devices during their setup process for capturing device-
specific traits, and subsequently mapped these signatures to the
device type by way of random forest classification. Thangavelu et
al. [51] also leveraged machine learning in order to classify types
of IoT devices, but managed to also do so with that not presented
in the training set. With that being said, one shortcoming of the
aforementioned procedures is that their scope is limited to local
IoT networks and thus do not present an Internet-wide perspective.
Further, their proposed techniques are not applicable on one-way
scan flows arriving at network telescopes. Additionally, in contrast,
we present a deep learning approach to distinguish compromised
IoT devices from infected multi-purpose systems using features in
sequences of TCP SYN packets.
IoT botnet analysis.Within the context of botnet analysis through
tailored honeypots, Pa et al. [37] were able to infer several malware
families by constructing a honeypot for the purpose of analyz-
ing attacks against Telnet services. Furthermore, Guarnizo et al.
[28] designed the IoT-centric Scalable high-Interaction Honeypot
(SIPHON) which showed an ability to attract a tremendous amount
of malicious IoT botnet-generated traffic through a combination of
worldwide wormholes and a small number of IoT devices. More-
over, Metongnon and Sadre [32] have recently reported on a large
number of exploited IoT protocols, based on the analysis of net-
work traffic from IoT-centric honeypots and network telescopes.
Given the copious amounts of IoT hardware in the wild and their
accompanying heterogeneity, we have to note that honeypot-based
methodologies frequently fail when it comes to mimicking all vul-
nerabilities for the vast assortment of IoT products and respective
firmware which is essential to attributing IoT botnets. Additionally,
the vantage points of honeypots are typically quite small, hindering
their effectiveness in tracking Internet-scale IoT botnets as well as
accurately estimating their population size. From another perspec-
tive, Herwig et al. [29] have recently provided a comprehensive
investigation related to the Hajime IoT botnet using active scanning
of Hajime’s peer to peer infrastructure and by leveraging a longitu-
dinal collection of root DNS backscatter traffic. While such a study
is interesting, the undertaken approach is designed to specifically
investigate this IoT botnet based on its infrastructure and can not
be generalized to other IoT botnets. That being said, the proposed
work in this paper compliments previous contributions by devising
and evaluating a generic approach to infer ongoing IoT botnets
based on the orchestration artifacts in their scanning modules.
3 PROPOSED METHODOLOGY
This section details the proposed approach as depicted in Figure 1.
Its core components include (i) data collection and dataset prepa-
ration, which entails preprocessing, introduces the darknet sani-
tization probabilistic model to filter out misconfiguration traffic
along with the inference of Internet-scale probing activities and
labeling their sources; (ii) the utilization of a deep learning binary
classifier for fingerprinting compromised IoT devices; and (iii) the
feature engineering process coupled with executing hierarchical
agglomerative clustering to infer and report on IoT botnets. These
steps are subsequently detailed.
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Figure 1: The components of the proposed approach
3.1 Network telescope sanitization model
Although network telescope (darknet) data predominantly consists
of malicious packets originating from probes, backscattered packets
from victims of distributed denial of service attacks, and malware
propagation attempts, it might also contain what is dubbed as mis-
configuration traffic. The latter non-malicious packets frequently
result from network/routing or hardware/software faults that were
erroneously directed towards a darknet. Another prospect is it being
an artifact of improper configuration during darknet deployment.
Indeed, misconfiguration traffic impedes the proper functioning
of cyber threat intelligence algorithms operating on darknet data,
which often yields numerous undesirable false positives and false
negatives. Additionally, its excessive existence is a sheer waste of
valuable storage resources. As a result, given the lack of formalism
in addressing this problem, the objective herein is to elaborate on
a probabilistic model that is specifically tailored towards the pre-
processing of darknet data by way of fingerprinting, and in turn,
filtering out embedded misconfiguration traffic.
In a nutshell, the model formulates and computes two metrics, with
the aim of capturing the behavioral perspective of misconfiguration
flows as they target the darknet space. Regarding the natural ten-
dencies associated with typical network flows, the model initially
estimates the rareness of access of the destination. Secondly, to en-
sure the inclusion of the unique characteristics of the given flow as
well, the scope of access is considered, which accounts for the num-
ber of distinct darknet IP addresses that a specific remote source
has accessed. Subsequently, the joint probability is formulated, com-
puted, and compared. If the probability of the source generating a
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misconfiguration flow is higher than that of the source being mali-
cious (or unsolicited), then that particular source is deemed to be
generating misconfiguration traffic, flagged, and the corresponding
flows are filtered out. In the following, we detail the notions of both
rareness and scope of access.
LetD = {d1,d2,d3, · · · } represent the set of darknet IP addresses,
with Di being a subset of those accessed by source si . First, the
model captures how unusual these accessed destinations are. The
underlying idea in doing so stems from the fact that misconfigured
sources target destinations seldom called upon by others [26]. Thus,
the model estimates the distribution of a darknet IP di as being
accessed by such a source as
Pmisc (di ) = ns (di )∑
∀dj ∈D ns (dj )
, (1)
where ns (di ) is the number of sources that have accessed di ; in
contrast, a malicious darknet source will target a given destina-
tion at random. Typically, defining a suitable probability distribu-
tion to exemplify the randomness of a malicious source taking
aim at a specific darknet destination is quite tedious; therefore,
a simplistic assumption is often applied to resolve this potential
headache. In this context, Durumeric et al. [19] demonstrated that
sources probe their darknet targets following a Gaussian distribu-
tion. By adopting that assumption, one can model the probability
of a darknet destination being accessed by a malicious source as
Pmal (di ) = 1σ√2π e
−
(
xdi −µ
)2/
2σ 2 where σ is the standard deviation,
µ is the mean, σ 2 is the variance, and x is the location of the darknet
destination following the aforementioned distribution. Recall that
not only does the model capture how unusual the accessed destina-
tions are, but it also considers the number of darknet destinations
accessed by a particular source, which we subsequently describe.
Given a set of Di darknet destinations accessed by a specific source
si , the model ultimately measures two probability distributions,
namely, Pmisc (Di ) and Pmal (Di ); the former being the probabil-
ity that Di has been generated by a misconfigured source and the
latter originating from that with a malicious intent towards dark-
net Di . For example, if the darknet addresses accessed by s1 are
D1 = {di1,di2,di3}, P(D1) equates to the probability of s1 access-
ing the specific combination of addresses {di1,di2,di3} given three
targeted destinations, multiplied by the probability of s1 accessing
any three destinations. In turn, we can generalize P(D1) as
P(Di ) = P(Di = {di1,di2, · · · ,din } | |Di | = n) × P(|Di | = n). (2)
For both a misconfigured and malicious source, the first term of
equation (2) can be modeled as
P(Di = {di1,di2, · · · } | |Di |) = 1K
∏
∀dj ∈Di
P(di ) (3)
where K, acting as a normalization constant and solely being
used as a means of summing the probabilities to 1, could be defined
as K = |D |!n!( |D |−n)! × 1|D |n . Please note that K is a standard normal-
ization constant that is often employed in Bayesian probability [27].
Moreover, n encompasses all sources in the data set, whereas |D |,
as previously mentioned, represents the darknet IP space. Conse-
quently, the likelihood that a source will target a certain number of
darknet destinations (i.e., the second term of equation (2)) depends
upon whether it is malicious or misconfigured. Characteristically,
misconfigured sources access one or few destinations while those
with malicious intent target a larger pool. In accordance, we have
modeled such distributions as
Pmisc (|Di |) = 1(e − 1)|Di |! (4)
Pmal (|Di |) =
1
|D | , (5)
where the term (e − 1) in equation (4) ensures the distribution’s
summing equates to 1. It should also be noted that equation (4)
guarantees a significant decrease in the probability as the number
of targeted destinations increases. In contrast, equation (5) captures
that of a random number of darknet addresses being accessed by a
malicious source. Thereby, via plugging in of equations (4) and (5)
into (3), respectively, we can represent the probability of a source
being either misconfigured or malicious, given a set of darknet
destination addresses, as
Pmisc (Di ) = 1
K(e − 1)|Di |!
∏
∀dj ∈Di
Pmisc (di ) (6)
Pmal (Di ) =
1
K |D |
∏
∀dj ∈Di
Pmal (di ). (7)
It is imperative to observe that equations (6) and (7) provide two
distinct likelihood models to distinguish between misconfiguration
and malicious, darknet-bound traffic, which enables their simplified
and systematic post-processing. As the proposed model generalizes
and formalizes the concepts of misconfiguration and malicious
darknet traffic, it does not make any assumptions regarding the
nature of the sources from which the given types of traffic are
originating. Thus, the method deems a source and its corresponding
flows as misconfiguration traffic if ln Pmisc (Di ) − ln Pmal (Di ) > 0.
Indeed, given that the field of Internet measurements for cyber
security heavily relies on processing network telescope data, we
make the code available in the mentioned repository to the research
and operations communities at large.
3.2 Data collection and dataset preparation
3.2.1 Inferring probing activities. After the sanitization of the mis-
configuration traffic by leveraging the aforementioned pre-processing
model, the objective herein is to dissect the malicious traffic to ex-
tract probing flows as indicators of exploitation. This is achieved
through a Threshold Random Walk (TRW)-based probing detec-
tion algorithm [39]. Essentially, the algorithm looks for subsequent
packets from the same source IP address for a duration of 300 sec-
onds; if a threshold is reached prior to the packet’s arrival, the given
counter is reset. If, on the other hand, the threshold has held and
the duration has not expired, the counter will be incremented. If the
counter reaches a threshold of 64 [46], the flow would be deemed
as a probing event.
3.2.2 Features’ extraction for IoT classification. Following the amal-
gamation of packets into flows, the first t consecutive packets are
extracted from each. Given that the majority of the observed scan-
ning traffic are TCP SYN scans, the applicable features would reside
in the TCP and IP header fields (i.e., ToS, Total Length, Identifica-
tion, TTL, Dst IP Address, srcPort, dstPort, TCP SEQ, TCP ACK
SEQ, TCP offset, TCP DATA Length, TCP Reserve, TCP Flags, TCP
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Win, TCP URP, TCP option, Packet Inter-arrival Time). Overall,
along with the inter-arrival time of the consecutive packets within
a flow,d = 17 features are gathered for each packet. In turn, the data
samples for each scanner IP address would consist of a t ×d matrix.
To elaborate on the model’s training procedure, we subsequently
detail the labeling process.
3.2.3 Port scanning and banner grabbing. In order to annotate de-
cidedly accurate labels for the training dataset, it was imperative
to immediately perform the procedure herein upon detection of
a scan activity to circumvent any potential complications due to
the dynamic reallocation of the associated device’s IP address (i.e.,
DHCP). To accomplish this, we utilized the gigabit open-source
Internet scanning tool ZMap [20] as well as the high-speed appli-
cation scanner ZGrab [18], in tandem, to provide comprehensive
results necessary for guaranteeing the versatility of the classifica-
tion task. Specifically, ZMap was used to probe the 45 most frequent
ports † of the IP addresses (that were previously inferred as probing
sources) that were still found to be active. These ports are selected
to cover most of the default ports of various devices (based on
reports by ZoomEye [57] in order to maximize the number of cap-
tured banners. Furthermore, via ZGrab, we were able to obtain
banner fields and application handshakes from various protocols
such as HTTP(s), CWMP, TELNET, SMTP(s), IMAP(s), POP3(s), SSH,
FTP, SMB, DNP3, MODBUS, BACNET, FOX, Siemens S7 and SSL
certificates. Additionally, we designed and developed two custom
scanning modules to extract RTSP and SIP banners.
3.2.4 Tagging/Labeling. We amalgamated a comprehensive list of
keywords related to major Internet-facing IoT devices and ven-
dors. As previously noted, these are typically the devices that are
most targeted by IoT botnets. This list consists of devices provided
by Nmap along with results from ZoomEye Internet Scanner and
ZTag, Censys’s tagging module. Although it is unrealistic to claim
that we cover all IoT products from all vendors, we indeed em-
ployed information from various sources and focused on widely
deployed Internet devices. In addition, we implemented a pars-
ing algorithm which extracts useful keywords from banners and
SSL certificates such as the combination of letters, digits, “-” and
“_” signs, which typically represent device models [24] to enrich
our list of devices. We further considered devices running multi-
purpose OSs as non-IoT, which were identified using keywords
such as “Win64”, “Ubuntu”, “Microsoft IIS” and “CentOS”, etc. while
we deemed other specialized devices as IoT where their OS types
were indicated as being “embedded”, “RouterOS”, “FritzOS” etc. †
We also filter out benign scanners that have targeted the network
telescope based on an obtained list† fromGreynoise.io and returned
information in banners.
3.3 Model training for fingerprinting
compromised IoT devices
We propose herein a learning approach for the extraction of em-
bedded features within unsolicited scan flows for the training of
a binary classifier which distinguishes between traffic originat-
ing from both malicious IoT and non-IoT devices. The underlying
methodology is based upon determining similarities in network
traffic that are exclusively associated with IoT devices and their
†We make this list publicly available in the mentioned repository.
corresponding IoT malware in order to fingerprint flows originating
from them. Additionally, it is known that IoT products manufac-
tured by the same vendor possess a uniform, low-level architecture
such as sharing a similar network card, operating system, etc., and
happen to share the same TCP/IP stack information, including but
not limited to TTL value and initial TCP window size, thus per-
mitting the fingerprinting of IP addresses that Internet scanning
services (i.e., Shodan) may have overlooked or could not identify.
To select a suitable and a sound learning technique, we compare
and contrast the performance of 5models to permit the classification
of compromised IoT devices in order to distinguish them from
compromised, multi-purpose hosts. The first three are based on
Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN), which are a category of
deep learning models that use dynamic kernels to automatically
extract features. To this end, we asses a two-dimensional CNN
(2D-CNN), a one-dimensional CNN (1D-CNN) [15] and a multi-
window one-dimensional CNN (MW-1D-CNN) [13] along with two
“shallow” learning methods rooted in Random Forest (RF) models.
In this context, an input sample consists of a matrix representa-
tion X of a flow with t packets and the number of extracted fields
d from a packet is considered, yielding X ∈ Rt×d . Namely, the ith
packet in a given flow is xi ∈ Rd . Convolution operations are also
defined by applying local kernelsw ∈ Rh×w on the input to extract
spatially local correlations in the data. In terms of the 2D-CNN
model, it contains L number of consecutive two dimensional con-
volutional layers (with k kernels of sizew ×w) and max pooling,
followed by two dense hidden layers of sizes 64 and 32, respec-
tively, and a Softmax classifier at the end (Figure 2a). The 1D-CNN
model has a similar architecture to the 2D-CNN, but instead, the
convolution kernels have a fixed kernel width equal to the input
sample width (i.e., h × d) (Figure 2b). Further, the MW-1D-CNN
model mixes the outputs of various kernel heights h to capture the
features. In turn, the output of the first layer of the proposed model
is given by ci = f (w ·xi :i+h−1+b), where xi :i+h−1 defines the nota-
tion for a sequence of packets xi , xi+1, ., xi+h−1, b representing the
bias, and f denoting the non-linear activation function. The filter
is applied to each 2D sample instance to produce a feature map
c = [c1, . . . , ct−h+1]. Subsequently, max pooling is applied over the
feature map c, taking the value max c. We used kernels w of differ-
ent window heights h (h = [2, 4, 6, ...,hmax ]) to enable the capture
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(a) 2D-CNN model
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(b) 1D-CNN model
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Figure 2: NN models for IoT/non-IoT binary classification
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of varying dynamics specific to darknet packet flows (Figure 2c).
We also devise two RF models, one that has been constructed using
raw packet features while the other operates on feature statistics.
We define feature statistics as the 5-tuple {min, 1-quantile,median,
3-quantile,max} of each field in flows of packets, which overall
produces 85 features. These statistics can be considered as an esti-
mation of the probability distribution function related to each field
of the packet sequence in each flow.
3.4 IoT botnets: features’ extraction and
campaign inference
Following filtering out non-IoT sources by employing the developed
classifier, we conduct a thorough investigation of the individual
scan flows FlowI P , each comprising of at least 500 (t ≥ 500) sequen-
tial packets originating from a particular unsolicited IoT device,
and extract the corresponding feature set FI P = < PortsI P , π I P ,
FlagI P , ARRI P>. PortsI P is the grouping of the targeted transport
protocols paired with their associated ports in ascending order
(e.g., PortsI Px = {TCP:23, TCP:80, TCP:8080}). In turn, π I P is the
corresponding discrete probability distribution function which rep-
resents the frequency of appearance of each of these ports within
the given flow of packets (e.g., π I Px = [0.15, 0.70, 0.15]). This is
relevant due to the fact that IoT devices typically possess a lim-
ited supply of resources and as a result, in the midst of conduct-
ing illicit scanning activities, are often allocated to different ports
and weighted based on the expected return. On the other hand,
FlagI P is a boolean variable, holding a value 1 if the IoT device
conducting the scanning has the signature tcpSeq == dstIP and
0 otherwise. This inference would provide some insights about a
Mirai-like behavior, possibly indicating a variant or a code-reuse
practice. Lastly, the Address Repetition Ratio, or ARRI P , is the
ratio of the total number of packets sent by a specific source IP
address over the number of unique destination IP addresses, and
is defined as ARRI P= |F low I P || {dst I P |dst I P ∈F low I P )} | . Such scenarios as
an ARRI P greater than one are a consequence of the sending of
multiple packets to a particular destination in order to compensate
for packet loss and/or the probing of multiple ports at each des-
tination. Note that, each instance of the same probing campaign
will exhibit an equivalent ARRI P due to the underlying IoT orches-
trated probing machinery. Consequently, we hierarchically divide
the IP addresses of the IoT scanners into separate groupsG i based
on the given PortsI P , FlagI P and ARRI P of their feature set FI P .
Upon completion, we cluster members of each groupG i to iden-
tify those scanning for the same set of ports but with a different
probability distribution function π . This enables us to leverage
hierarchical agglomerative clustering [56], which determines the
proximity matrix by calculating the distance between every pair
of probability distribution functions {π I P |IP ∈ G i } based upon the
Jensen-Shannon Divergence (JSD) distance metric. JSD, defined
in (8), is typically utilized to estimate the distance between two
discrete distribution functions, and is the symmetrized version of
the well-known Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLD).
JSD(π i | |π j ) = 12KLD(π i | |M ) +
1
2KLD(π j | |M ), (8)
whereM = 12 (π i + π j ). and KLD(P | |Q ) = −
∑
i P (i) log(Q (i)P (i) ) for
discrete PDF P andQ .
We select hierarchical agglomerative clustering due to the fact
that other clustering methods (such as K-means) are based on the
assumption of equal cluster sizes which is not correct in this case
while density-based techniques are computationally intensive with
the increase in input data samples. Thereupon and proceeding
in a bottom-up fashion, each observation forms its own cluster
and begins moving up the distance-based hierarchy, subsequently
merging with the clusters positioned along the way. To designate
appropriate consolidation, we use a distance threshold (of 0.05) in
which merging only occurs if the distance between the two given
cluster centers falls beneath.
4 EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
The evaluation was executed using 3.6 TB of darknet traffic that
was collected for a 24-hour period on Dec. 13th, 2018. This data was
provided by the Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis (CAIDA)
/8 network telescope. While the dataset per se is subject to MOUs
and thus cannot be shared as is, interested readers can request
access to CAIDA’s real-time darknet data through DHS IMPACT
[38]. Additionally, a 24-hour sample is available in the mentioned
repository.
4.1 Results of the darknet sanitization model
By executing the proposed model of Section 3.1, the distribution of
malicious andmisconfiguration trafficwith respect to the number of
packets were found to be 88.21% and 11.21%, while in the matter of
source IP addresses were 26.17% and 73.83%, respectively. Validation
of such outcome revealed that close to 90% of the misconfiguration
traffic defines packets that hit the /8 network telescope only once,
while the remaining appeared to be malformed packets. Further,
it can be observed that even though the misconfiguration traffic
is relatively low (11.79%), it is responsible for a large proportion
of the source IP addresses (73.83%). These findings not only shed
more light on the problematic nature of misconfiguration traffic
with regards to Internet measurements via network telescopes,
but consequentially emphasize the effectiveness of the proposed
pre-processing model.
For the runtime specifics of the implementation which heavily
relied on the Linux-derived libpcap C++ library, running on an
Ubuntu 18.04 system with a quad core Intel Core i7-8550 at 1.80GHz
processor, and 16GB of RAM, the developed approach was able
to process close to 10 GB of darknet data in around 8 minutes.
We believe this could be vastly improved by switching to SSD
storage (since most of the delay was I/O related) and by adopting
multithreading.
4.2 Results of datasets preparation
Regarding the data collection and dataset preparation steps of Sec-
tion 3.2, and by immediately scanning back about 1.7M Internet
scanners inferred through the network telescope, about 25.84% of
them were found to have at least one open port. Further, amongst
total 543, 392 gathered banners, most of them were HTTP (54.11%),
FTP (11.10%), SSL Certificate (10.50%), TELNET (10.19%), RTSP
(7.00%), and CWMP (2.60%). Having completed this task, we were
able to distinguish between 45,184 IoT and 7,763 non-IoT devices
to design the training data set. At this juncture, the label and cor-
responding metadata were incorporated into t × d training and
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test data matrices of IoT and non-IoT devices. We shuffled them
and then performed normalization by way of the MinMax method,
after which we computed and removed the mean from the data.
Consequently, to evaluate the proposed model, we trained it using a
prepared dataset captured in Nov. 2018 and then tested it using our
dataset from Dec. 2018. The one month gap between the training
and test datasets ensured that there exists no correlation between
them for sound evaluation. The test dataset consisted of 34,974 IoT
and 7,193 non-IoT sources.
4.3 Evaluating the IoT classification models
The proposed CNN models were implemented in Keras [14] over
Tensorflow. To address the problem of class imbalance within the
training dataset, cost-sensitive learning was applied [50]. The num-
ber of epochs was found to be 30 to avoid over-fitting. Further, we
performed a random search on subspaces of hyper-parameters as
presented in Table 1, leveraging Hyperas [42], and selected the best
model (out of 100 trials) with regards to the loss. Accordingly, the RF
models were implemented and trained using the scikit-learn pack-
age and the best model was retrieved based upon random search
(using the RandomizedSearchCV method) in the search space as
summarized in Table 2. In Tables 1 and 2, parameter ranges are
reported with begin:step:end format. For evaluating the CNN
models, we leverage an NVIDIA GeForce RTX 2070 GPU with 8GB
of memory, 2304 CUDA cores and 288 Tensor cores to accommodate
for parallelization.
To compare the performance of the different models, we rely on
typical metrics such as precision, recall and F-measure for the IoT
class. We report the results in Figures 3 and 4. We can note that the
AUC-ROC score for the RF model trained on quantiles is slightly
higher than that of the other models. Further, both of the figures
reveal that the CNN-based models result in higher recall and lower
precision scores in contrast to the RF models. The outcome also
shows that the multi window 1D-CNN (MW-1D-CNN) outperforms
the 1D-CNN and the 2D-CNN; this is quite expected, since packet
fields (unlike image pixels) lack temporal or spatial relationships
with one another, and thus moving the kernels over the horizontal
dimensionwould not lead to better learning. Furthermore, themulti-
window 1D-CNN can capture varying dynamics being that only a
portion of packets hit the /8 darknet.
Features’ importance. Although CNN models extract complex
features, they are typically not interpretable. Nevertheless, to shed
light on which features were most decisive in the learning process,
and given that the RF models performed closely to the CNN models,
we illustrate the features’ scores (derived from the RF model on
quantiles) in Figure 5. Expectedly, the distribution of destination
Table 1: Tuned hyperparameters of the selected CNN models
Parameters Space 2D-CNN 1D-CNN MW-1D-CNN
Optimizer SGD, Adam, RMSProp RMSProp RMSProp RMSProp
Num. of kernels (k) 32,64,128 32 128 64
Kernel size (w ×w) (2,2),(3,3) (2,2) - -
Kernel height (h) 2,4,8,16,32,64 - 64 -
Max kernel height (hmax ) 40:10:80 - - 80
Pool size (p) 2,3 2 3 -
Batch size 128, 256 128 256 256
Activations Relu, Sigmoid, Tanh Sigmoid Tanh Sigmoid
Dropout U (0.1, 0.3) 0.195 0.296 0.298
learning rate 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Num. CNN layers (L) 1:1:4 4 3 -
Table 2: Tuned hyperparameters of the RF models
Parameters Space RF on raw fields RF on Quantiles
Num. estimators 20:20:100 60 60
Max depth 4:4:20 12 12
Min samples leaf 2:10:102 52 52
Min samples split U (2, 10) 6 4
Bootstrap True, False False False
Criterion Gini, Entropy Entropy Gini
ports which typically reveals the scans’ intentions is indeed playing
the most noteworthy role for fingerprinting IoT devices. This is
closely followed by other fields such as total packet length and total
header length, in addition to TCP/IP stack and OS-related fields
such as TCP window size, option fields and TTL.
4.4 Inferring and characterizing compromised
IoT devices and campaigns
Given the aforementioned classification results, we selected the
MW-1D-CNN model since it provided the highest true positive
rate while strictly limiting the false positive rate to around 0.08
(Figure 4). We further re-trained the model on recent data from
Dec. 2018 to accompany for any evolving dynamics. By applying
the binary classifier on 24 hours of darknet data of Dec. 13th, it was
capable of fingerprinting 441,766 out of the 1,787,718 unique scan-
ners to be originating from compromised IoT devices. Although
previous works solely considered those with a Mirai signature as
IoT-related [5], we inferred that in fact, they make up less than 25%
of the IoT scanner population that the proposed model was able to
uncover, leaving a whopping 75% to go about their malicious activ-
ities without any semblance of an adequate attribution. Regarding
the location of these exploited devices, Brazil (41.93%) was found to
be hosting a significant portion, followed by Iran (10.17%), China
(5.14%), Russia (3.59%), Egypt (3.36%), India (2.47%) and Turkey
(2.32%). Furthermore, the top three Internet Service Providers (ISP)
housing the largest number of compromised IoT devices were Vivo
(134, 021), TE Data (11, 804) and Iran Telecom Co. (9, 912). While
the extensive presence of IoT scanners in and of itself gives pause
for concern, a relatively significant proportion residing within the
telecommunication and ISP sectors is rather expected; conversely,
their existence within sectors including but not limited to critical
sectors [30], is downright alarming. Indeed, amongst the inferred
instances, quite a few were found to be located within that of med-
ical infrastructures (87), government entities (86), manufacturing
(99), and commercial businesses (38).
Along those lines, the lengthy list of 50 identified vendors re-
veals a broad range of manufactures and device types that IoT
botnets demonstrate preference for exploitation. Amongst them,
MikroTik (14, 090), Aposonic (2, 222), Huawei (732), Foscam (594)
and Hikvision (417) are the topmost five targeted by the tagged
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compromised devices. Routers (53.64%) and IP Camera/DVR (28.93%)
continue to be the most frequently infected devices. Moreover, the
most commonly targeted ports based upon the number of scanning
packets were inferred to be 23 (%41.9), 80 (%23.9), 8080 (%19.7),
5555 (%4.9), 81 (%3.2), 2323 (%1.7) and 22 (%1.3). Intriguingly, we
identified the presence of non-IoT targeted ports such as 2480 (Ori-
entDB), 5984 (CouchDB), 3389 (RDP), 7001 (Oracle), 5900 (VNC)
and 2004 (Drupal), as well as that of uncommonly used IoT ports
32764 (router backdoor), 37215 (UPnP in SOHO routers) and 52869
(UPnP in wireless chipsets).
Inferring and reporting on orchestrated IoT botnets. Amid
the 441,766 IoT scanners that were detected on Dec. 13th, 2018,
those that sent less than 500 packets were filtered out to exclude
any of those that began at the end of the day, which can degrade
the output of the probability distribution function π . Subsequently,
the respective features were extracted and the clustering method
described in Section 3.4 was executed. It is worth mentioning that
in roughly 40,000 scan flows, we witnessed a share of the scanning
packets arriving at UDP ports. After thorough analysis of such
occurrences, we deduced that they were resulting from associated
bugs or attacks on p2p networks such as BitTorrent, which was
in accordance with the observation made by [6]. As a result, in
order to avoid the ill-effects of uncorrelated incidents, the identified
packets were removed prior to clustering. Regarding the inferred
campaigns, the proposed approach detected over 350 orchestrated
IoT botnets. To this end, given that the size of each IoT probing cam-
paign translates to its given severity, we summarize those botnets
possessing more than 300 coordinated IoT bots in Table 3. Inter-
estingly, in solely considering IoT scanners that targeted the set of
ports {23, 80, 8080}, we detected 30 distinct botnets with differing
distributions, Flag (i.e., Mirai-like signature/behavior), and ARR.
IoT botnets with cryptojacking capability.Aside from the dom-
inant monetization method for IoT botnets of performing DDoS
attacks, cryptojacking has become a noteworthy prevailing tech-
nique. In essence, compromised routers have become responsible
for injecting JavaScript crypto-currency miners into the HTTP
pages requested by devices on their network. These JavaScript
miners such as Coinhive [1] and xmrMiner [55], to name a few,
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Figure 5: Ranking of features’ importance
strive for Monero altcoin in particular. To this end, we examined
the HTTP requests’ responses to the IoT scanners, tagging those
that contain the xmrMiner or Coinhive JavaScript modules, and
exporting their corresponding keys. By doing so, we were able to
discover 1,134 xmrMiner and 923 Coinhive instances with 23 and
30 distinct keys, respectively. The campaigns designated as con-
taining members with cryptojacking capabilities are pinpointed in
Table 3. In addition, we uncovered large campaigns maintaining
crypto miner instances with and without the presence of Mirai-like
signatures. Moreover, 943 out of 1,134 devices, belonging to a total
of 18 campaigns (#1, #2, #4, #5, #7, #8, #11, #13, #15, #16, #19, #20
#21, #24, #32, #33, #35 and #36), share the same xmrMiner-related
key “4983e34ef01b4b579725b3a228e59e79". In other words, large
portions of immense IoT campaigns could be reported to be attrib-
uted to the same “player”. On top of that, upon exploring the key
within Censys, 54,743 Mikrotikswere shown to possess it. In total,
these campaigns equate to approximately 250,000 compromised IoT
devices–more than 54% of all the identified compromised devices.
A closer look at other campaigns of interest. Campaign #3
with 36,464 bots was inferred to be targeting ports 23 and 2323
with a proportion of 9:1, which is the same as instructed within
the Mirai released code. Another interesting observation is related
to botnet #26 (of Table 3) where packets to random TCP and UDP
ports were sent in addition to targeting the defined set of ports of
{23, 2480, 5555, 5984, 80, 8080}. Additionally, this campaign targeted
port 2480 (OrientDB) and 5984 (CouchDB), as well as other common
IoT-related ports including 23, 5555 (ADB) and 8080. Upon further
analysis, this behavior could be indeed attributed to the infamous
Hide and Seek botnet [45].
In the context of port 32764 which is related to a backdoor vulner-
ability [52], the proposed IoT botnet clustering approach revealed
a campaign of substantial size (#19 in Table 3), consisting of 2,140
active IoT scanners with the following signature <{23, 32764, 80,
8000, 8080, 8081, 8089, 8090, 81, 8181, 8443, 8888, 9000}, Flag=1,
ARR=1>. We did not come across any previously reported botnet
families that scan such ports. As a result, we postulated that this
campaign is either new or specific ports have been recently added
to the target list of a previously known IoT botnet. Another aspect
is that this is the only large campaign that exploited a relatively
significant number of NUUO products, which is a common indica-
tor of the Reaper IoT botnet. The JenX botnet [21], which scans
ports 37215 and 52869, was also disclosed. Moreover, a botnet with
<{2004, 80, 8080, 81}, Flag=0, ARR=2 > was also discovered and
consisted of 35 coordinated IoT scanners, all of which compromised
QNAP NAS. This campaign strongly resembles that of the Muhstik
botnet [44], with the exception of the substitution of port 7001 with
81 in the target port set.
With the prevalence of IoT botnets, port 5555 (Android debug
bridge) has become a popular target port. We found 23 IoT botnets
that port 5555 is among their target port set. Based on the reports
on ADB miner [3] and the similarity of its scanning module to
Mirai, we can attribute the inferred large IoT botnet (#5 in Table 3)
to Mirai or its variant Fbot [4]. Additionally, we found xmrMiner
instances with the same previously noted key in the latter campaign
and in campaign #16. Based off the set of target ports pertaining to
campaign #25 (port 23, 5358), it seems to be highly likely attributed
to that of the Hajime [29, 43] IoT botnet. In total, this campaign
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possessed 1,059 active IoT scanners (made up of IP cameras/DVRs).
Furthermore, amidst the inferred campaigns exists those whose
geo-distributions do not comply with that of the global distribution
of infections. For instance, with respect to campaigns #13, #22 and
#27, more than 98% of their infected IoT devices are located in Iran.
In another instances, campaign #30 has upwards of 50% and 10% of
compromised IoT devices located in USA and the UK, respectively,
and the majority of the members of campaign #28 are located in
North America (40%) and Europe (21%).
Table 3: Orchestrated IoT botnets in the wild
Id Ports Flag ARR #Bots π Miners
1 23, 80, 8080 1 139,858 [0.33 0.33 0.34]
2 23, 80, 8080 1 55,139 [0.294 0.295 0.411]
3 23, 2323 ✓ 1 36,464 [0.9 0.1]
4 80 ✓ 1 12,895 [1.]
5 5555 ✓ 1 11,050 [1.]
6 23, 81 1 9,805 [0.495 0.505]
7 23, 80, 8080 2 7,610 [0.171 0.650 0.179]
8 23 ✓ 1 7,200 [1.]
9 23, 80, 8080 1 5,971 [0.242 0.244 0.514]
10 23 3 5,491 [1.]
11 80, 8080 1 5,162 [0.492 0.508]
12 23 1 4,689 [1.]
13 23, 80, 8080 1 4,468 [0.442 0.032 0.526]
14 23 4 3,911 [1.]
15 22, 2222 ✓ 1 3,783 [0.897 0.103]
16 23, 2323, 5555 ✓ 1 3,545 [0.249 0.032 0.719]
17 23, 2323 ✓ 1 2,727 [0.967 0.033]
18 23 2 2,146 [1.]
19 23, 32764, 80, 8000,
8080, 8081, 8089,
8090, 81, 8181, 8443,
8888, 9000
✓ 1 2,140 [0.034 0.122 0.153
0.02 0.154 0.02 0.019
0.02 0.068 0.123
0.122 0.022 0.121]
20 23, 8080 1 1,591 [0.48 0.52]
21 23, 80, 8080 1 1,286 [0.384 0.319 0.298]
22 80, 8080+rnd 1 1,247 [0.45 0.45]
23 23, 81 1 1,191 [0.095 0.905]
24 23, 80, 8080 1 1,083 [0.226 0.5 0.274]
25 23, 5358 1 1,059 [0.5 0.5]
26 23, 2480, 5555, 5984,
80, 8080+rnd
✓ 1 783 [0.126 0.120 0.134
0.121 0.128 0.121]
27 80, 8080 3 756 [0.814 0.186]
28 443, 80, 8000, 8001,
8080, 8081, 8088, 81,
82, 83, 84, 85, 88,
8888
✓ 1 723 [0.071 0.071 0.071
0.071 0.071 0.071
0.071 0.072 0.072
0.072 0.071 0.072
0.071 0.072]
29 23, 2323 ✓ 1 691 [0.794 0.206]
30 23, 9000 1 677 [0.49 0.51]
31 23 5 642 [1.]
32 80 1 616 [1.]
33 23, 80, 8080 1 544 [0.15 0.3 0.55]
34 23, 81 1 541 [0.291 0.709]
35 23, 445, 80, 8080 1 376 [0.3142 0.0587
0.3155 0.3115]
36 23, 7547, 80, 8080,
8291
1 340 [0.334 0.002 0.33
0.331 0.002]
Coinhive xmrMiner
A note on Industrial Control Systems (ICS). We also inferred
an IoT botnet of 25 bots with the signature <{102, 8888, 993}, Flag=0,
ARR=1>, probing Siemens S7 (heavily used in SCADA systems), IEC
61850 and ICCP (both are mostly used in utility/electric substations)
on port 102. To provide additional insights, we also actively scanned
each of the identified compromised IoT devices for ICS open ports
on TCP and UDP 102 (S7), 502 (MODBUS), 20000 (DNP3), 47808
(BACNET) and 1911 (FOX) and found 100, 101, 465, 70 and 85 devices
with open ports, respectively. We note that we have also inferred
close to 40 devices having simultaneously all the above-mentioned
ICS ports open, which we thought are related to ICS honeypots.
Nevertheless, the appearance of compromised IoT devices within
ICS setups is indeed alarming.
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS
This work compliments current IoT-centric research by offering a
macroscopic, generic and passive methodology to infer Internet-
scale compromised IoT devices and to report on ongoing IoT botnets.
The work initially introduces a novel darknet-specific sanitization
model that contributes to the field of Internet measurements at
large. Subsequently, by devising a binary classifier based upon a
CNN in conjunction with active measurements, the proposed work
is capable of fingerprinting compromised IoT devices by solely
operating on darknet traffic. Consequently, by automating the gen-
eration of signatures related to the ports being probed coupled
with their distribution in addition to other simplistic yet effective
features, the proposed approach provides the capability to infer
and track ongoing orchestrated botnets. The results demonstrate
the significant security issue with the IoT paradigm by exposing
more than 400,000 exploited IoT devices during only a 24-hour
period, some of which have been deployed in critical sectors such
medical and manufacturing. Additionally, the outcome provides
evidence-based indicators related to ongoing IoT botnets such as
those of Mirai, Hide and Seek, and Reaper, to name a few. More
interestingly, the results demonstrate evolving IoT botnets with
cryptojacking capabilities, where many of those seem to be attrib-
uted to the same mastermind by exposing the same employed key.
As for future work, we will be attempting to address some of the
limitations of the current research, such as the misidentification of
two different IoT botnets which may possess the exact same feature
set in addition to improving the tagging/labeling procedure. We
will also be examining IoT-specific malware samples and devising
formal methodologies between the traffic they generate from one
side and the corresponding darknet traffic from the other side, to
fortify the attribution evidence.
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